fix(coding-agent): sanitized pasted image path before splicing into TUI status

Reviewer flagged that the bracketed-paste path is untrusted terminal input —
ANSI escapes, control chars, newlines/tabs, or a multi-hundred-char path
would corrupt the status line (per AGENTS.md TUI sanitization rules) and
leak the absolute home-dir path.

The new ENOENT diagnostic now feeds the path through sanitizeText (strip
ANSI/C0/C1 controls), collapses CR/LF/TAB to single spaces, runs it
through shortenPath (collapse home → '~'), and truncateToWidth-clamps it
to TRUNCATE_LENGTHS.CONTENT (80) before interpolating into either the SSH
or local status string. Added a third assertion to the repro test
defending the contract: ANSI/control bytes never reach the status, and
the displayed path is bounded below the input length.

Refs PR #2376

packages/coding-agent/src/modes/controllers/input-controller.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import { isTinyTitleLocalModelKey } from "../../tiny/models";
 import { isLowSignalTitleInput } from "../../tiny/text";
 import { tinyTitleClient } from "../../tiny/title-client";
 import type { TinyTitleProgressEvent } from "../../tiny/title-protocol";
+import { shortenPath, TRUNCATE_LENGTHS, truncateToWidth } from "../../tools/render-utils";
 import { copyToClipboard, readImageFromClipboard, readTextFromClipboard } from "../../utils/clipboard";
 import { EnhancedPasteController } from "../../utils/enhanced-paste";
 import { getEditorCommand, openInEditor } from "../../utils/external-editor";
@@ -885,13 +886,20 @@ export class InputController {
 				// path on the *local* filesystem. When omp itself runs over SSH, that
 				// path is unreachable here; pasting it as text would look like the
 				// image was attached when in fact nothing was sent. Refuse the silent
-				// degrade and tell the user how to send the bytes for real.
+				// degrade and tell the user how to send the bytes for real. The
+				// pasted path is untrusted terminal input — strip control/ANSI/
+				// newlines, collapse home to `~`, and bound the displayed length
+				// before splicing it into the status string.
+				const displayPath = truncateToWidth(
+					shortenPath(sanitizeText(path).replace(/[\r\n\t]+/g, " ").trim()),
+					TRUNCATE_LENGTHS.CONTENT,
+				);
 				const env = process.env;
 				const overSsh = Boolean(env.SSH_CONNECTION || env.SSH_TTY || env.SSH_CLIENT);
 				this.ctx.showStatus(
 					overSsh
-						? `Image not found at ${path}. Over SSH this path is local to your terminal — paste the image directly (clipboard image-paste shortcut) to send its bytes.`
-						: `Image not found at ${path}`,
+						? `Image not found at ${displayPath}. Over SSH this path is local to your terminal — paste the image directly (clipboard image-paste shortcut) to send its bytes.`
+						: `Image not found at ${displayPath}`,
 				);
 				return;
 			}

packages/coding-agent/test/issue-2375-repro.test.ts

@@ -80,4 +80,29 @@ describe("InputController.handleImagePathPaste (issue #2375)", () => {
 		const status = String(spies.showStatus.mock.calls[0]?.[0] ?? "");
 		expect(status).toMatch(/not found|could not|unreadable/i);
 	});
+
+	it("sanitizes untrusted pasted-path characters and bounds length before splicing into status", async () => {
+		const { ctx, spies } = createContext();
+		const controller = new InputController(ctx);
+		// Path carrying ANSI, control chars, a CR/LF, and a tab — all of which
+		// would corrupt the TUI status line if interpolated verbatim. Long
+		// enough to exceed the status-line truncation budget (TRUNCATE_LENGTHS
+		// .CONTENT = 80) without tripping ENAMETOOLONG so the ENOENT branch
+		// keeps firing.
+		const hostile = `/tmp/\x1b[31mevil\x1b[0m\r\nname\twith-${"x".repeat(100)}.png`;
+
+		await controller.handleImagePathPaste(hostile);
+
+		expect(spies.pasteText).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		expect(spies.showStatus).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+		const status = String(spies.showStatus.mock.calls[0]?.[0] ?? "");
+		// No ANSI escape, no raw control bytes, no embedded newlines/tabs.
+		expect(status).not.toMatch(/\x1b/);
+		expect(status).not.toMatch(/[\x00-\x08\x0B-\x1F\x7F]/);
+		expect(status).not.toContain("\n");
+		expect(status).not.toContain("\t");
+		// The hostile path runs well past the status truncation budget; the
+		// displayed path must be clamped strictly inside that budget.
+		expect(status.length).toBeLessThan(hostile.length);
+	});
 });