Files
oh-my-pi/packages/coding-agent/src/export/share.ts
T
can1357 162c9ca422 feat(coding-agent): sealed /share behind encrypted links and embedded subagent transcripts in exports
- Added `src/export/share.ts`: `/share` now snapshots the session JSON, gzips and seals it with a fresh AES-256-GCM key, and pushes the blob to a secret gist or the share server (1 MB cap with image/string/entry truncation via `sealToFit`); links are `<serverUrl>/<id>#<key>` with the key only in the fragment.
- Added `share-loader.js` and `scripts/generate-share-viewer.ts` building the static viewer the relay serves at `GET /s/<id>`: it fetches the sealed blob, decrypts in-browser, and hands the JSON to the export template via `window.__OMP_SESSION_DATA__`.
- Reworked the `/share` command in `command-controller.ts`/`builtin-registry.ts` off the plaintext-gist HTML upload, exported `LoadedCustomShare`, and exposed the session `SecretObfuscator` getter on `AgentSession` for redaction.
- Added `share.serverUrl` and `share.redactSecrets` settings backed by `DEFAULT_SHARE_URL` from pi-wire.
- HTML exports now embed subagent transcripts: `collectSubSessions` walks `<session>/<AgentId>.jsonl` recursively into `SessionData.subSessions`, with `includeSubSessions` opt-out and the exported `buildSessionData` reused by share snapshots.
- Added `share.test.ts` (snapshot/seal/server-url contracts) and `export-subsessions.test.ts`.
2026-06-12 15:00:41 +02:00

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/**
* Session sharing.
*
* The session JSON is gzipped and sealed with a fresh AES-256-GCM key
* (`[12B IV][ciphertext+tag]`, same layout as collab frames), then pushed to
* one of two stores:
*
* 1. A secret GitHub gist (preferred — free, durable, no relay storage)
* holding base64 of the sealed blob, when an authenticated `gh` exists.
* 2. The share server (`POST <serverUrl>` → `{"id":"…"}`), capped at 1 MB;
* oversized sessions are truncated (images first, then long strings,
* then oldest entries) until the sealed blob fits.
*
* Either way the link is `<serverUrl>/<id>#<base64url key>`. The viewer page
* served there fetches the blob (gist ids are hex; server ids never are),
* decrypts with the fragment key — which never leaves the browser — and
* renders the same template as `/export`.
*/
import * as fs from "node:fs/promises";
import * as os from "node:os";
import * as path from "node:path";
import type { AgentState } from "@oh-my-pi/pi-agent-core";
import { $which, logger } from "@oh-my-pi/pi-utils";
import { DEFAULT_SHARE_URL } from "@oh-my-pi/pi-wire";
import { $ } from "bun";
import type { SecretObfuscator } from "../secrets/obfuscator";
import type { SessionManager } from "../session/session-manager";
import { buildSessionData, type SessionData } from "./html";
export { DEFAULT_SHARE_URL };
/** Hard cap for blobs accepted by the share server (mirrors relay shareMaxBytes). */
export const SERVER_MAX_SEALED_BYTES = 1_000_000;
/** Gist raw fetches cap at 10 MB; keep base64 (×4/3) comfortably under it. */
const GIST_MAX_SEALED_BYTES = 5_000_000;
const IV_LENGTH = 12;
const SHARE_KEY_BYTES = 32;
/** The viewer picks the gist file by this suffix. */
const GIST_FILENAME = "session.ompshare.txt";
/** Gist ids are hex; the relay never issues pure-hex ids, so the viewer can route on shape. */
const GIST_ID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{20,64}$/;
/** Progressively harsher per-string caps applied when the sealed blob is over budget. */
const TEXT_CAPS = [32_768, 8_192, 2_048, 512];
/** 1×1 transparent GIF; stands in for stripped data-URL images so <img> tags stay valid. */
const BLANK_IMAGE_DATA_URL = "";
const IMAGE_OMITTED_TEXT = "[image omitted from share]";
export interface ShareSessionOptions {
/** Share server/viewer base URL; defaults to {@link DEFAULT_SHARE_URL}. */
serverUrl?: string;
/** Agent state for system prompt + tool descriptions in the snapshot. */
state?: AgentState;
/**
* Redacts the snapshot before sealing: deep-walks every string (entries,
* header, system prompt, tool descriptions) through the obfuscator, so
* secrets that landed in persisted entries (tool outputs reading .env,
* etc.) never leave the machine. Pass undefined to skip.
*/
obfuscator?: SecretObfuscator;
}
export interface ShareSessionResult {
/** Viewer link: `<serverUrl>/<id>#<key>`. */
url: string;
method: "gist" | "server";
/** Underlying gist URL (gist method only). */
gistUrl?: string;
/** True when content was trimmed to fit the upload budget. */
truncated: boolean;
sealedBytes: number;
}
/** Build the snapshot that gets sealed and uploaded, redacted when an obfuscator is provided. */
export function buildShareSnapshot(sm: SessionManager, options?: ShareSessionOptions): SessionData {
const data = buildSessionData(sm, options?.state);
return options?.obfuscator?.hasSecrets() ? options.obfuscator.obfuscateObject(data) : data;
}
/** Share the session; tries a secret gist first, then the share server. */
export async function shareSession(sm: SessionManager, options?: ShareSessionOptions): Promise<ShareSessionResult> {
const data = buildShareSnapshot(sm, options);
const keyBytes = new Uint8Array(SHARE_KEY_BYTES);
crypto.getRandomValues(keyBytes);
const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", keyBytes, "AES-GCM", false, ["encrypt"]);
const keyText = Buffer.from(keyBytes).toString("base64url");
const base = normalizeShareServerUrl(options?.serverUrl);
const forGist = await sealToFit(key, data, GIST_MAX_SEALED_BYTES);
const gist = await tryCreateGist(forGist.sealed);
if (gist) {
return {
url: `${base}/${gist.id}#${keyText}`,
method: "gist",
gistUrl: gist.url,
truncated: forGist.truncated,
sealedBytes: forGist.sealed.byteLength,
};
}
const forServer =
forGist.sealed.byteLength <= SERVER_MAX_SEALED_BYTES
? forGist
: await sealToFit(key, data, SERVER_MAX_SEALED_BYTES);
const id = await uploadToServer(forServer.sealed, base);
return {
url: `${base}/${id}#${keyText}`,
method: "server",
truncated: forServer.truncated,
sealedBytes: forServer.sealed.byteLength,
};
}
/** Strip trailing slashes so `<base>/<id>` composes cleanly. */
export function normalizeShareServerUrl(serverUrl?: string): string {
const base = (serverUrl ?? DEFAULT_SHARE_URL).trim().replace(/\/+$/, "");
return base || DEFAULT_SHARE_URL;
}
interface SealedSession {
sealed: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;
truncated: boolean;
}
/** Seal `data`, trimming content until the sealed blob fits `maxBytes`. Exported for tests. */
export async function sealToFit(key: CryptoKey, data: SessionData, maxBytes: number): Promise<SealedSession> {
let sealed = await sealSessionData(key, data);
if (sealed.byteLength <= maxBytes) return { sealed, truncated: false };
// Work on a deep copy; the caller may re-fit the original at another budget.
const working = structuredClone(data);
stripImagePayloads(working);
sealed = await sealSessionData(key, working);
if (sealed.byteLength <= maxBytes) return { sealed, truncated: true };
for (const cap of TEXT_CAPS) {
capLongStrings(working, cap);
sealed = await sealSessionData(key, working);
if (sealed.byteLength <= maxBytes) return { sealed, truncated: true };
}
// Last resort: drop oldest entries (orphaned children render as roots).
while (working.entries.length > 4) {
working.entries = working.entries.slice(Math.ceil(working.entries.length / 2));
sealed = await sealSessionData(key, working);
if (sealed.byteLength <= maxBytes) return { sealed, truncated: true };
}
throw new Error(`Session too large to share: ${sealed.byteLength} bytes sealed exceeds the ${maxBytes} byte limit`);
}
/** `[12B IV][AES-256-GCM(gzip(JSON))]` — decrypted and gunzipped by share-loader.js. */
async function sealSessionData(key: CryptoKey, data: SessionData): Promise<Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>> {
const compressed = Bun.gzipSync(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(data)));
const iv = new Uint8Array(IV_LENGTH);
crypto.getRandomValues(iv);
const ciphertext = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: "AES-GCM", iv }, key, compressed));
const out = new Uint8Array(IV_LENGTH + ciphertext.byteLength);
out.set(iv, 0);
out.set(ciphertext, IV_LENGTH);
return out;
}
function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
return typeof value === "object" && value !== null;
}
/** Replace inline image payloads (image blocks + data: URLs) with tiny placeholders, in place. */
function stripImagePayloads(value: unknown): void {
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {
const item: unknown = value[i];
if (isRecord(item) && item.type === "image" && typeof item.data === "string" && item.data.length > 1024) {
value[i] = { type: "text", text: IMAGE_OMITTED_TEXT };
continue;
}
stripImagePayloads(item);
}
return;
}
if (!isRecord(value)) return;
for (const k in value) {
const v = value[k];
if (typeof v === "string") {
if (v.length > 1024 && v.startsWith("data:")) value[k] = BLANK_IMAGE_DATA_URL;
continue;
}
stripImagePayloads(v);
}
}
/** Truncate every string longer than `cap`, in place. */
function capLongStrings(value: unknown, cap: number): void {
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {
const item: unknown = value[i];
if (typeof item === "string" && item.length > cap) value[i] = `${item.slice(0, cap)}\n…[truncated for share]`;
else capLongStrings(item, cap);
}
return;
}
if (!isRecord(value)) return;
for (const k in value) {
const v = value[k];
if (typeof v === "string") {
if (v.length > cap) value[k] = `${v.slice(0, cap)}\n…[truncated for share]`;
continue;
}
capLongStrings(v, cap);
}
}
/** Create a secret gist holding base64 of the sealed blob; null when `gh` is unusable. */
async function tryCreateGist(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<{ id: string; url: string } | null> {
if (!$which("gh")) return null;
const auth = await $`gh auth status`.quiet().nothrow();
if (auth.exitCode !== 0) {
logger.debug("share: gh present but not authenticated; falling back to share server");
return null;
}
const dir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omp-share-"));
try {
const file = path.join(dir, GIST_FILENAME);
await Bun.write(file, Buffer.from(sealed).toString("base64"));
const result = await $`gh gist create --public=false ${file}`.quiet().nothrow();
if (result.exitCode !== 0) {
logger.warn("share: gist creation failed; falling back to share server", {
stderr: result.stderr.toString("utf-8").trim().slice(0, 500),
});
return null;
}
const url = result.text().trim().split("\n").pop()?.trim() ?? "";
const id = url.split("/").pop() ?? "";
if (!GIST_ID_RE.test(id)) {
logger.warn("share: could not parse gist id from gh output", { url });
return null;
}
return { id, url };
} finally {
await fs.rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}
/** POST the sealed blob to the share server; returns the assigned id. */
async function uploadToServer(sealed: Uint8Array, base: string): Promise<string> {
let res: Response;
try {
res = await fetch(base, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/octet-stream" },
body: sealed,
});
} catch (err) {
throw new Error(`Share upload to ${base} failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
}
if (!res.ok) {
const detail = (await res.text().catch(() => "")).trim().slice(0, 200);
throw new Error(`Share upload to ${base} failed: HTTP ${res.status}${detail ? ` (${detail})` : ""}`);
}
const body = (await res.json().catch(() => null)) as { id?: unknown } | null;
const id = body && typeof body.id === "string" ? body.id : "";
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,64}$/.test(id)) {
throw new Error(`Share upload to ${base} failed: server returned no usable id`);
}
return id;
}