can1357
591f1c5765
- Added id-based credential persistence and CAS-based invalidation to prevent cross-process race conditions. - Categorized OAuth failure responses into transient and definitive types for more resilient refresh orchestration. - Enabled stable credential lookups during refresh to ensure integrity during peer rotation or index shifts. - Validated new persistence and error handling logic through comprehensive concurrency and failure-mode tests.
68 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
68 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Contract for {@link isDefinitiveOAuthFailure} — the shared classifier that
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* decides whether an OAuth refresh error tears the credential down (re-login
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* required) or is a transient blip to block-and-retry. A false positive here
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* permanently disables a healthy account, so the 403 / rate-limit / 5xx cases
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* below are load-bearing, not cosmetic.
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*/
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import { describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
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import { isDefinitiveOAuthFailure } from "@oh-my-pi/pi-ai/auth-storage";
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describe("isDefinitiveOAuthFailure", () => {
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it("treats explicit dead-grant errors as definitive", () => {
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for (const msg of [
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'HTTP 400 invalid_grant {"error":"invalid_grant"}',
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"invalid_token",
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"OAuth refresh failed: refresh token revoked",
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'invalid_grant {"error_description":"Refresh token expired"}',
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"unauthorized_client",
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]) {
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expect(isDefinitiveOAuthFailure(msg)).toBe(true);
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}
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});
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it("treats a bare 401 from the token endpoint as definitive", () => {
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expect(isDefinitiveOAuthFailure("HTTP 401 Unauthorized")).toBe(true);
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});
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it("never treats a bare 403 as definitive (WAF / egress / permission, not a dead token)", () => {
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// Regression: a shared broker egress IP that gets 403'd by the provider,
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// or a google PERMISSION_DENIED / account-verification 403, must NOT
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// permanently disable an otherwise-valid credential.
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expect(isDefinitiveOAuthFailure("HTTP 403 Forbidden")).toBe(false);
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expect(isDefinitiveOAuthFailure("403 PERMISSION_DENIED: account verification required")).toBe(false);
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expect(isDefinitiveOAuthFailure("blocked by cloudflare (403)")).toBe(false);
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});
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it("treats rate-limit and server/gateway errors as transient", () => {
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for (const msg of [
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"429 too many requests",
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"HTTP 503 Service Unavailable",
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"500 internal server error",
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"rate limit exceeded",
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]) {
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expect(isDefinitiveOAuthFailure(msg)).toBe(false);
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}
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});
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it("treats network blips as transient (incl. ECONNRESET)", () => {
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for (const msg of [
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"fetch failed: ECONNRESET",
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"fetch failed: ECONNREFUSED",
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"ETIMEDOUT",
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"socket hang up",
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"network error",
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"OAuth token refresh timed out for provider: anthropic",
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]) {
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expect(isDefinitiveOAuthFailure(msg)).toBe(false);
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}
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});
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it("lets a transient signal override a bare 401 (rate-limited auth endpoint)", () => {
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// A 401 wrapped in a rate-limit / 5xx context is the provider throttling,
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// not a dead grant — block-and-retry instead of nuking the row.
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expect(isDefinitiveOAuthFailure("401 unauthorized — 429 too many requests")).toBe(false);
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expect(isDefinitiveOAuthFailure("502 bad gateway (was 401 upstream)")).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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