d868519149
Redacted assistant anthropicServerTool blocks alongside redactedThinking and providerPayload so /share never uploads raw server_tool_use input or web_search_tool_result encrypted_content.
683 lines
23 KiB
TypeScript
683 lines
23 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Session sharing.
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*
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* The session JSON is gzipped and sealed with a fresh AES-256-GCM key
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* (`[12B IV][ciphertext+tag]`, same layout as collab frames), then pushed to
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* one of two stores, chosen by `share.store`:
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*
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* 1. The share server (default — `POST <serverUrl>` → `{"id":"…"}`), capped
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* at 1 MB; oversized sessions are truncated (images first, then long
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* strings, then oldest entries) until the sealed blob fits.
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* 2. A secret GitHub gist (`store: "gist"`, when an authenticated `gh`
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* exists; falls back to the share server) holding base64 of the blob.
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*
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* Either way the link is `<serverUrl>/<id>#<base64url key>`. The viewer page
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* served there fetches the blob (gist ids are hex; server ids never are),
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* decrypts with the fragment key — which never leaves the browser — and
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* renders the same template as `/export`.
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*/
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import * as fs from "node:fs/promises";
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import * as os from "node:os";
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import * as path from "node:path";
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import type { AgentMessage, AgentState } from "@oh-my-pi/pi-agent-core";
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import type { AssistantMessage, ImageContent, TextContent } from "@oh-my-pi/pi-ai";
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import { $which, logger } from "@oh-my-pi/pi-utils";
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import { DEFAULT_SHARE_URL } from "@oh-my-pi/pi-wire";
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import { $ } from "bun";
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import { obfuscateToolArguments, type SecretObfuscator } from "../secrets/obfuscator";
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import { type SessionEntry, type SessionHeader, TITLE_CHANGE_ENTRY_TYPE } from "../session/session-entries";
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import type { SessionManager } from "../session/session-manager";
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import type { OutputMeta } from "../tools/output-meta";
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import { buildSessionData, type SessionData, type SubSession } from "./html";
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export { DEFAULT_SHARE_URL };
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/** Hard cap for blobs accepted by the share server (mirrors relay shareMaxBytes). */
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export const SERVER_MAX_SEALED_BYTES = 1_000_000;
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/** Gist raw fetches cap at 10 MB; keep base64 (×4/3) comfortably under it. */
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const GIST_MAX_SEALED_BYTES = 5_000_000;
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const IV_LENGTH = 12;
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const SHARE_KEY_BYTES = 32;
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/** The viewer picks the gist file by this suffix. */
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const GIST_FILENAME = "session.ompshare.txt";
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/** Gist ids are hex; the relay never issues pure-hex ids, so the viewer can route on shape. */
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const GIST_ID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{20,64}$/;
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/** Progressively harsher per-string caps applied when the sealed blob is over budget. */
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const TEXT_CAPS = [32_768, 8_192, 2_048, 512];
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/** 1×1 transparent GIF; stands in for stripped data-URL images so <img> tags stay valid. */
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const BLANK_IMAGE_DATA_URL = "";
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const IMAGE_OMITTED_TEXT = "[image omitted from share]";
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export type ShareStore = "blob" | "gist";
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export interface ShareSessionOptions {
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/** Share server/viewer base URL; defaults to {@link DEFAULT_SHARE_URL}. */
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serverUrl?: string;
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/**
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* Where to upload the sealed blob. `"blob"` (default) posts to the share
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* server; `"gist"` pushes to a secret GitHub gist first (needs an
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* authenticated `gh`) and falls back to the server.
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*/
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store?: ShareStore;
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/** Agent state for system prompt + tool descriptions in the snapshot. */
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state?: AgentState;
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/**
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* Redacts the snapshot before sealing via a typed, per-field walk over the
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* session (header title/cwd, system prompt, tool descriptions, entry summaries,
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* labels, and message text — including tool-result output and `@file` mentions),
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* so secrets that landed in persisted entries (tool outputs reading .env, etc.)
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* never leave the machine. Inline image bytes are preserved (size-trimmed
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* separately); opaque provider-replay blobs (`providerPayload`,
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* `redactedThinking`, `compaction.preserveData`) and untyped extension payloads
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* (`details`/`data`/`outputSchema`) are dropped rather than walked. Pass
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* undefined to skip redaction entirely.
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*/
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obfuscator?: SecretObfuscator;
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}
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export interface ShareSessionResult {
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/** Viewer link: `<serverUrl>/<id>#<key>`. */
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url: string;
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method: "gist" | "server";
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/** Underlying gist URL (gist method only). */
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gistUrl?: string;
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/** True when content was trimmed to fit the upload budget. */
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truncated: boolean;
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sealedBytes: number;
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}
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/** Build the snapshot that gets sealed and uploaded, redacted when an obfuscator is provided. */
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export function buildShareSnapshot(sm: SessionManager, options?: ShareSessionOptions): SessionData {
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const data = buildSessionData(sm, options?.state);
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return options?.obfuscator?.hasSecrets() ? redactSessionDataForShare(options.obfuscator, data) : data;
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}
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/**
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* Redact secrets from a share snapshot. A share blob leaves the machine, so
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* every text-bearing field is rewritten through the obfuscator. The walk is
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* typed end-to-end (no generic object traversal): inline image bytes are left
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* intact (size-trimmed later by {@link stripImagePayloads}) and opaque,
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* untyped payloads we cannot redact field-by-field (`compaction.preserveData`,
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* extension `details`/`data`, `mode_change.data`, structured output schemas)
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* are dropped so they cannot leak.
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*/
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function collectShareRegexSecretValues(o: SecretObfuscator, data: SessionData): Set<string> {
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const values = new Set<string>();
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const add = (value: string | undefined): void => {
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if (value === undefined) return;
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for (const secretValue of o.collectRegexSecretValuesForObfuscation(value)) {
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values.add(secretValue);
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}
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};
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const addJsonStrings = (value: unknown): void => {
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if (typeof value === "string") {
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add(value);
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return;
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}
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if (Array.isArray(value)) {
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for (const item of value) addJsonStrings(item);
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return;
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}
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if (!isRecord(value)) return;
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for (const item of Object.values(value)) addJsonStrings(item);
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};
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const addContent = (content: string | (TextContent | ImageContent)[]): void => {
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if (typeof content === "string") {
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add(content);
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return;
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}
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for (const block of content) {
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if (block.type === "text") add(block.text);
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}
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};
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const addOutputMeta = (meta: OutputMeta | undefined): void => {
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if (!meta) return;
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add(meta.source?.value);
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if (!meta.diagnostics) return;
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add(meta.diagnostics.summary);
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for (const message of meta.diagnostics.messages) add(message);
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};
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const addMessage = (message: AgentMessage): void => {
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switch (message.role) {
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case "user":
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case "developer":
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case "custom":
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case "hookMessage":
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case "toolResult":
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addContent(message.content as string | (TextContent | ImageContent)[]);
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return;
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case "assistant":
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add(message.errorMessage);
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for (const block of message.content) {
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if (block.type === "text") add(block.text);
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else if (block.type === "thinking") add(block.thinking);
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else if (block.type === "toolCall") {
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addJsonStrings(block.arguments);
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add(block.intent);
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add(block.rawBlock);
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}
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}
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return;
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case "bashExecution":
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add(message.command);
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add(message.output);
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addOutputMeta(message.meta);
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return;
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case "pythonExecution":
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add(message.code);
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add(message.output);
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addOutputMeta(message.meta);
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return;
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case "branchSummary":
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add(message.summary);
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return;
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case "compactionSummary":
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add(message.summary);
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add(message.shortSummary);
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if (message.blocks) addContent(message.blocks);
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return;
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case "fileMention":
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for (const file of message.files) {
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add(file.path);
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add(file.content);
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}
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return;
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default:
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return;
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}
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};
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const addEntry = (entry: SessionEntry): void => {
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switch (entry.type) {
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case "message":
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addMessage(entry.message);
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return;
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case "compaction":
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add(entry.summary);
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add(entry.shortSummary);
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return;
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case "branch_summary":
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add(entry.summary);
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return;
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case "custom_message":
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addContent(entry.content);
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return;
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case "session_init":
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add(entry.systemPrompt);
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add(entry.task);
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return;
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case "label":
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add(entry.label);
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return;
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case TITLE_CHANGE_ENTRY_TYPE:
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add(entry.title);
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add(entry.previousTitle);
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add(entry.trigger);
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return;
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default:
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return;
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}
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};
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const addHeader = (header: SessionHeader | null): void => {
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if (!header) return;
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add(header.title);
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add(header.cwd);
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};
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addHeader(data.header);
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add(data.systemPrompt);
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for (const tool of data.tools ?? []) add(tool.description);
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for (const entry of data.entries) addEntry(entry);
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for (const sub of Object.values(data.subSessions ?? {})) {
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addHeader(sub.header);
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for (const entry of sub.entries) addEntry(entry);
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}
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return values;
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}
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function redactShareHeader(
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o: SecretObfuscator,
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header: SessionHeader | null,
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sharedRegexSecretValues: ReadonlySet<string>,
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): SessionHeader | null {
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if (!header) return header;
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return {
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...header,
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title: header.title === undefined ? undefined : o.obfuscate(header.title, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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cwd: o.obfuscate(header.cwd, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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};
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}
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function redactSessionDataForShare(o: SecretObfuscator, data: SessionData): SessionData {
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const sharedRegexSecretValues = collectShareRegexSecretValues(o, data);
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return {
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...data,
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header: redactShareHeader(o, data.header, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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systemPrompt:
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data.systemPrompt === undefined ? undefined : o.obfuscate(data.systemPrompt, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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tools: data.tools?.map(tool => ({
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...tool,
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description: o.obfuscate(tool.description, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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})),
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entries: data.entries.map(entry => redactShareEntry(o, entry, sharedRegexSecretValues)),
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subSessions: data.subSessions
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? Object.fromEntries(
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Object.entries(data.subSessions).map(([key, sub]) => [
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key,
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redactShareSubSession(o, sub, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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]),
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)
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: data.subSessions,
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};
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}
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function redactShareSubSession(
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o: SecretObfuscator,
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sub: SubSession,
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sharedRegexSecretValues: ReadonlySet<string>,
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): SubSession {
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return {
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...sub,
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header: redactShareHeader(o, sub.header, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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entries: sub.entries.map(entry => redactShareEntry(o, entry, sharedRegexSecretValues)),
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};
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}
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function redactShareEntry(
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o: SecretObfuscator,
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entry: SessionEntry,
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sharedRegexSecretValues: ReadonlySet<string>,
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): SessionEntry {
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switch (entry.type) {
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case "message":
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return { ...entry, message: redactShareMessage(o, entry.message, sharedRegexSecretValues) };
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case "compaction":
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return {
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...entry,
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summary: o.obfuscate(entry.summary, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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shortSummary:
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entry.shortSummary === undefined ? undefined : o.obfuscate(entry.shortSummary, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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details: undefined,
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preserveData: undefined,
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};
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case "branch_summary":
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return { ...entry, summary: o.obfuscate(entry.summary, sharedRegexSecretValues), details: undefined };
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case "custom_message":
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return {
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...entry,
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content: redactShareContent(o, entry.content, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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details: undefined,
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};
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case "custom":
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return { ...entry, data: undefined };
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case "mode_change":
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return { ...entry, data: undefined };
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case "session_init":
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return {
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...entry,
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systemPrompt: o.obfuscate(entry.systemPrompt, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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task: o.obfuscate(entry.task, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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outputSchema: undefined,
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};
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case "label":
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return {
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...entry,
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label: entry.label === undefined ? undefined : o.obfuscate(entry.label, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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};
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case TITLE_CHANGE_ENTRY_TYPE:
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return {
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...entry,
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title: o.obfuscate(entry.title, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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previousTitle:
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entry.previousTitle === undefined
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? undefined
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: o.obfuscate(entry.previousTitle, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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trigger: entry.trigger === undefined ? undefined : o.obfuscate(entry.trigger, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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};
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default:
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return entry;
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}
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}
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function redactShareContent(
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o: SecretObfuscator,
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content: string | (TextContent | ImageContent)[],
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sharedRegexSecretValues: ReadonlySet<string>,
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): string | (TextContent | ImageContent)[] {
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if (typeof content === "string") return o.obfuscate(content, sharedRegexSecretValues);
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return content.map(block =>
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block.type === "text" ? { ...block, text: o.obfuscate(block.text, sharedRegexSecretValues) } : block,
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);
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}
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/** Redact freeform strings in tool output metadata (source path/URL, diagnostics); numeric truncation info is preserved. */
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function redactShareOutputMeta(
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o: SecretObfuscator,
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meta: OutputMeta | undefined,
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sharedRegexSecretValues: ReadonlySet<string>,
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): OutputMeta | undefined {
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if (!meta) return meta;
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return {
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...meta,
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source: meta.source
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? { ...meta.source, value: o.obfuscate(meta.source.value, sharedRegexSecretValues) }
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: meta.source,
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diagnostics: meta.diagnostics
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? {
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summary: o.obfuscate(meta.diagnostics.summary, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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messages: meta.diagnostics.messages.map(message => o.obfuscate(message, sharedRegexSecretValues)),
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}
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: meta.diagnostics,
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};
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}
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function redactShareMessage(
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o: SecretObfuscator,
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message: AgentMessage,
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sharedRegexSecretValues: ReadonlySet<string>,
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): AgentMessage {
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switch (message.role) {
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case "user":
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case "developer":
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return {
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...message,
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providerPayload: undefined,
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content: redactShareContent(o, message.content, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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} as AgentMessage;
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case "custom":
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case "hookMessage":
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return {
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...message,
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details: undefined,
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content: redactShareContent(o, message.content, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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} as AgentMessage;
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case "toolResult":
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return {
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...message,
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details: undefined,
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content: redactShareContent(o, message.content, sharedRegexSecretValues) as (TextContent | ImageContent)[],
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};
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case "assistant":
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// Drop opaque provider-replay state (encrypted reasoning / native history) the viewer
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// never reads and we cannot redact field-by-field: `providerPayload`, any
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// `redactedThinking` blocks, and native Anthropic server-tool blocks
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// (`server_tool_use` input / `web_search_tool_result` encrypted_content).
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return {
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...message,
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providerPayload: undefined,
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errorMessage:
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message.errorMessage === undefined
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? undefined
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: o.obfuscate(message.errorMessage, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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content: message.content.flatMap((block): AssistantMessage["content"] => {
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if (block.type === "redactedThinking" || block.type === "anthropicServerTool") return [];
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if (block.type === "text") return [{ ...block, text: o.obfuscate(block.text, sharedRegexSecretValues) }];
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if (block.type === "thinking") {
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return [{ ...block, thinking: o.obfuscate(block.thinking, sharedRegexSecretValues) }];
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}
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if (block.type === "toolCall") {
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return [
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{
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...block,
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arguments: obfuscateToolArguments(o, block.arguments, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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intent:
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block.intent === undefined ? undefined : o.obfuscate(block.intent, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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rawBlock:
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block.rawBlock === undefined
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? undefined
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: o.obfuscate(block.rawBlock, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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},
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];
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}
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return [block];
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}),
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};
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case "bashExecution":
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return {
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...message,
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command: o.obfuscate(message.command, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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output: o.obfuscate(message.output, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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meta: redactShareOutputMeta(o, message.meta, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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};
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case "pythonExecution":
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return {
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...message,
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code: o.obfuscate(message.code, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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output: o.obfuscate(message.output, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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meta: redactShareOutputMeta(o, message.meta, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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};
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case "branchSummary":
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return { ...message, summary: o.obfuscate(message.summary, sharedRegexSecretValues) };
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case "compactionSummary":
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return {
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...message,
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providerPayload: undefined,
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summary: o.obfuscate(message.summary, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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shortSummary:
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message.shortSummary === undefined
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? undefined
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: o.obfuscate(message.shortSummary, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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blocks:
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message.blocks === undefined
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? undefined
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: (redactShareContent(o, message.blocks, sharedRegexSecretValues) as (TextContent | ImageContent)[]),
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};
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case "fileMention":
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return {
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...message,
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files: message.files.map(file => ({
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...file,
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path: o.obfuscate(file.path, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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content: o.obfuscate(file.content, sharedRegexSecretValues),
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})),
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};
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default:
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return message;
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}
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}
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/** Share the session; uploads to the share server unless `options.store` is `"gist"`. */
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export async function shareSession(sm: SessionManager, options?: ShareSessionOptions): Promise<ShareSessionResult> {
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const data = buildShareSnapshot(sm, options);
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const keyBytes = new Uint8Array(SHARE_KEY_BYTES);
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crypto.getRandomValues(keyBytes);
|
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const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", keyBytes, "AES-GCM", false, ["encrypt"]);
|
||
const keyText = Buffer.from(keyBytes).toString("base64url");
|
||
const base = normalizeShareServerUrl(options?.serverUrl);
|
||
|
||
if (options?.store === "gist") {
|
||
const forGist = await sealToFit(key, data, GIST_MAX_SEALED_BYTES);
|
||
const gist = await tryCreateGist(forGist.sealed);
|
||
if (gist) {
|
||
return {
|
||
url: `${base}/${gist.id}#${keyText}`,
|
||
method: "gist",
|
||
gistUrl: gist.url,
|
||
truncated: forGist.truncated,
|
||
sealedBytes: forGist.sealed.byteLength,
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
// gh unusable or gist creation failed — fall back to the share server.
|
||
return shareViaServer(key, data, base, keyText, forGist);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return shareViaServer(key, data, base, keyText);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** Strip trailing slashes so `<base>/<id>` composes cleanly. */
|
||
export function normalizeShareServerUrl(serverUrl?: string): string {
|
||
const base = (serverUrl ?? DEFAULT_SHARE_URL).trim().replace(/\/+$/, "");
|
||
return base || DEFAULT_SHARE_URL;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
interface SealedSession {
|
||
sealed: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;
|
||
truncated: boolean;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** Seal `data`, trimming content until the sealed blob fits `maxBytes`. Exported for tests. */
|
||
export async function sealToFit(key: CryptoKey, data: SessionData, maxBytes: number): Promise<SealedSession> {
|
||
let sealed = await sealSessionData(key, data);
|
||
if (sealed.byteLength <= maxBytes) return { sealed, truncated: false };
|
||
|
||
// Work on a deep copy; the caller may re-fit the original at another budget.
|
||
const working = structuredClone(data);
|
||
stripImagePayloads(working);
|
||
sealed = await sealSessionData(key, working);
|
||
if (sealed.byteLength <= maxBytes) return { sealed, truncated: true };
|
||
|
||
for (const cap of TEXT_CAPS) {
|
||
capLongStrings(working, cap);
|
||
sealed = await sealSessionData(key, working);
|
||
if (sealed.byteLength <= maxBytes) return { sealed, truncated: true };
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Last resort: drop oldest entries (orphaned children render as roots).
|
||
while (working.entries.length > 4) {
|
||
working.entries = working.entries.slice(Math.ceil(working.entries.length / 2));
|
||
sealed = await sealSessionData(key, working);
|
||
if (sealed.byteLength <= maxBytes) return { sealed, truncated: true };
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
throw new Error(`Session too large to share: ${sealed.byteLength} bytes sealed exceeds the ${maxBytes} byte limit`);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** `[12B IV][AES-256-GCM(gzip(JSON))]` — decrypted and gunzipped by share-loader.js. */
|
||
async function sealSessionData(key: CryptoKey, data: SessionData): Promise<Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>> {
|
||
const compressed = Bun.gzipSync(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(data)));
|
||
const iv = new Uint8Array(IV_LENGTH);
|
||
crypto.getRandomValues(iv);
|
||
const ciphertext = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: "AES-GCM", iv }, key, compressed));
|
||
const out = new Uint8Array(IV_LENGTH + ciphertext.byteLength);
|
||
out.set(iv, 0);
|
||
out.set(ciphertext, IV_LENGTH);
|
||
return out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
|
||
return typeof value === "object" && value !== null;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** Replace inline image payloads (image blocks + data: URLs) with tiny placeholders, in place. */
|
||
function stripImagePayloads(value: unknown): void {
|
||
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
|
||
for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {
|
||
const item: unknown = value[i];
|
||
if (isRecord(item) && item.type === "image" && typeof item.data === "string" && item.data.length > 1024) {
|
||
value[i] = { type: "text", text: IMAGE_OMITTED_TEXT };
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
stripImagePayloads(item);
|
||
}
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
if (!isRecord(value)) return;
|
||
for (const k in value) {
|
||
const v = value[k];
|
||
if (typeof v === "string") {
|
||
if (v.length > 1024 && v.startsWith("data:")) value[k] = BLANK_IMAGE_DATA_URL;
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
stripImagePayloads(v);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** Truncate every string longer than `cap`, in place. */
|
||
function capLongStrings(value: unknown, cap: number): void {
|
||
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
|
||
for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {
|
||
const item: unknown = value[i];
|
||
if (typeof item === "string" && item.length > cap) value[i] = `${item.slice(0, cap)}\n…[truncated for share]`;
|
||
else capLongStrings(item, cap);
|
||
}
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
if (!isRecord(value)) return;
|
||
for (const k in value) {
|
||
const v = value[k];
|
||
if (typeof v === "string") {
|
||
if (v.length > cap) value[k] = `${v.slice(0, cap)}\n…[truncated for share]`;
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
capLongStrings(v, cap);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** Create a secret gist holding base64 of the sealed blob; null when `gh` is unusable. */
|
||
async function tryCreateGist(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<{ id: string; url: string } | null> {
|
||
if (!$which("gh")) return null;
|
||
const auth = await $`gh auth status`.quiet().nothrow();
|
||
if (auth.exitCode !== 0) {
|
||
logger.debug("share: gh present but not authenticated; falling back to share server");
|
||
return null;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const dir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omp-share-"));
|
||
try {
|
||
const file = path.join(dir, GIST_FILENAME);
|
||
await Bun.write(file, Buffer.from(sealed).toString("base64"));
|
||
const result = await $`gh gist create --public=false ${file}`.quiet().nothrow();
|
||
if (result.exitCode !== 0) {
|
||
logger.warn("share: gist creation failed; falling back to share server", {
|
||
stderr: result.stderr.toString("utf-8").trim().slice(0, 500),
|
||
});
|
||
return null;
|
||
}
|
||
const url = result.text().trim().split("\n").pop()?.trim() ?? "";
|
||
const id = url.split("/").pop() ?? "";
|
||
if (!GIST_ID_RE.test(id)) {
|
||
logger.warn("share: could not parse gist id from gh output", { url });
|
||
return null;
|
||
}
|
||
return { id, url };
|
||
} finally {
|
||
await fs.rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** Seal to the server cap (reusing `preFit` when it already fits) and upload. */
|
||
async function shareViaServer(
|
||
key: CryptoKey,
|
||
data: SessionData,
|
||
base: string,
|
||
keyText: string,
|
||
preFit?: SealedSession,
|
||
): Promise<ShareSessionResult> {
|
||
const forServer =
|
||
preFit && preFit.sealed.byteLength <= SERVER_MAX_SEALED_BYTES
|
||
? preFit
|
||
: await sealToFit(key, data, SERVER_MAX_SEALED_BYTES);
|
||
const id = await uploadToServer(forServer.sealed, base);
|
||
return {
|
||
url: `${base}/${id}#${keyText}`,
|
||
method: "server",
|
||
truncated: forServer.truncated,
|
||
sealedBytes: forServer.sealed.byteLength,
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** POST the sealed blob to the share server; returns the assigned id. */
|
||
async function uploadToServer(sealed: Uint8Array, base: string): Promise<string> {
|
||
let res: Response;
|
||
try {
|
||
res = await fetch(base, {
|
||
method: "POST",
|
||
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/octet-stream" },
|
||
body: sealed,
|
||
});
|
||
} catch (err) {
|
||
throw new Error(`Share upload to ${base} failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
|
||
}
|
||
if (!res.ok) {
|
||
const detail = (await res.text().catch(() => "")).trim().slice(0, 200);
|
||
throw new Error(`Share upload to ${base} failed: HTTP ${res.status}${detail ? ` (${detail})` : ""}`);
|
||
}
|
||
const body = (await res.json().catch(() => null)) as { id?: unknown } | null;
|
||
const id = body && typeof body.id === "string" ? body.id : "";
|
||
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,64}$/.test(id)) {
|
||
throw new Error(`Share upload to ${base} failed: server returned no usable id`);
|
||
}
|
||
return id;
|
||
}
|