Review raised that `apply_patch`'s non-overwrite contract for `create` and
a rename destination is decided with `Bun.file(dst).exists()`, which
reports `false` when the parent hides the target's metadata rather than
distinguishing "absent" from "unknown" — so a privileged handler could
be asked to write over a protected file it was told not to touch.
Reproduced all three shapes: no handler is consulted in any of them. A
hidden-metadata destination is refused by the path resolver, because the
same denied `lstat` that fools the existence check also leaves the final
component unproven, and an unverifiable destination is never brokered. A
destination that is a symlink onto a protected file is caught earlier —
`exists()` follows the link and reports `true`. A plainly visible
existing file is caught by the same check.
So the contract holds, but it holds through two independent guards in two
files. Pinned that with a regression test asserting the premise (the
existence check cannot see the file), that no handler is consulted, and
that the file is intact; deleting the resolver's symlink proof makes it
fail. Recorded the coupling in the module header too, since relaxing the
refusal to broker unverifiable paths would silently break exclusivity
and needs an explicit intent field first.
Larry Gordon
2c5a9c43aa