`ReadMcpResourceExecResult` has a `rejected` variant carrying `reason`,
not `error`, so the pairing text's collapsed error branch did not
typecheck against the full union. Each variant is now switched
explicitly; the refusal is unreachable today (the handler answers
content or `null`) but a collapsed default would have read `undefined`
if the client ever builds one.
`bun check` type-checks the workspace projects; the union error only
surfaced through `ci:check:full`, which is what CI runs.
Also renames a loop variable that shadowed the global `escape`, which
was failing `biome check` on the full tree.
(cherry picked from commit f5dca418d91983a14492f51f2873514781a9e066)
Every native `pi_edit` failed after a session switched onto Cursor. The
replace-mode `edit` instance the frame needs was built only for sessions
CREATED on Cursor, and the tool roster is built once, at creation - a
session that started elsewhere kept its configured-mode `edit` in the
registry, which `executeTool` resolves before its fallback, so the
frame's `old_text`/`new_text` pairs failed validation against a
`hashline` schema.
The instance is now built from the `edit` grant regardless of the
initial provider, lazily so a session that never reaches Cursor never
constructs one, and `pi_edit` asks for it through a dedicated
`getEditReplaceTool` accessor rather than relying on Cursor sessions
having deleted `edit` from the registry. A session that was never
granted `edit` is still refused.
That accessor also closes an escalation the previous wiring opened up.
The session's device resolver is handed to the bridge as `getTool` and
installed as the agent loop's `resolveFallbackTool`, which runs for ANY
call outside the advertised set - so serving `edit` from it let a
hallucinated call, or one naming a tool the session deselected after
startup, execute a replace-mode edit the model was never offered. It is
device-only again.
Regressions cover both directions at the SDK level, driving a real
unadvertised `edit` through the loop and asserting the surfaced
`Tool edit not found`: an unchanged file alone would also pass if the
fallback had resolved the tool and the edit then failed validation.
(cherry picked from commit 11a28dcf7b995a9e94913269733b3199d6f4790d)
Download-mode resource reads created and overwrote workspace files
without running a registry tool - the same hole the native `delete`
frame had - so a session that withheld `write`/`edit`, or whose `write`
tier is `deny`/`always-ask`, still had files written. Both frames now
share one grant and one policy check, and the download refuses before
the read so a blocked call never fetches the resource.
`allowNativeDelete` is renamed `allowDirectFileMutation`: it now gates
more than deletion. The primary session derives it from the registry
BEFORE its own rewriting (Cursor moves `edit` out of the tool map and
`write` may be auto-registered later, so reading the map at bridge
construction would misjudge both) and unconditionally, since the bridge
is installed for every session and one that starts on another provider
can switch to Cursor later.
`pi_grep` with a match cap: the local tool windows to 20 files and
suggests `skip`, which `PiGrepExecArgs` cannot express - 100 matches
requested over 25 one-match files returned 20, with the cap reported
unreached. A capped search now reads cap+1 files, so a result landing
exactly on the cap is distinguishable from a clipped one, and
`match_limit_reached` is truthful either way.
`read_mcp_resource` synthesized no transcript block and paired no
result, so a read - including a download that mutates the workspace -
was invisible in the UI and stripped from every rebuilt history. It now
synthesizes a `read_mcp_resource` block (not `read`: the name drives
rendering and prune semantics) and pairs success, not-found and error.
(cherry picked from commit 5ff27a3efe8bec522d9d5dbd7763055eb03eae3b)
Hard link escape: a hardlink inside the workspace is a regular file
that passes containment AND `O_NOFOLLOW` while sharing its inode with
a file anywhere else, so truncating it clobbers that file. Proven
before the fix. The open now drops `O_TRUNC`, checks `nlink`/regular
on the OPEN handle, and truncates only after - the pattern
`autolearn/managed-skills.ts` already uses. `O_NOFOLLOW` covers the
final component only; the parent-swap window is documented, not
claimed shut.
MCP resource discovery: `getServerResources` is async and awaits
`ensureServerResources`, so a frame arriving while a server's catalog
still loads no longer reads the empty cache and reports "advertises
nothing" - a lie the model cannot distinguish from the truth.
Mixed-content reads: the mime type came from `contents[0]` while the
payload came from whichever item supplied it, so an image blob
followed by a text note sent the text as `image/png`.
Ranged `pi_read`: a plain `:N+K` selector pads one leading and three
trailing context lines, so offset 5/limit 20 handed Cursor lines 4-27.
Ranged reads compose `:raw:N+K`, verified against a real `ReadTool`.
The wire result is an opaque string, so the gutter `raw` drops is not
part of the contract.
(cherry picked from commit 679785aa6b3243ea39b26abf4dda9435960019b1)
A lexical containment check is not containment. `out/config` is
relative and `..`-free, so it passed - while a `ws/out -> /elsewhere`
link inside the workspace sent the write straight out. Proven before
the fix: the download landed in the link's target.
Containment now realpaths three things: the target when it exists, the
immediate link destination when it is a dangling symlink (a write still
follows it), and otherwise the deepest existing ancestor with the
not-yet-created segments re-applied. Each branch has a regression, and
all three fail the suite when individually reverted.
Also moves this branch's ai/catalog changelog entries back under
[Unreleased]; two commits had re-landed them inside the released
[17.1.5] section, which left `packages/ai/CHANGELOG.md` with two.
All three released sections are now byte-identical to upstream/main.
(cherry picked from commit e3ed4035ab8a1781c49a68c1fbe92c88bec3aa25)
`download_path` is workspace-relative by contract, but it arrives from
the server and `resolveToCwd` deliberately honors absolute paths, `~`,
and `..` - correct for a path a user typed, a write-anywhere primitive
for one a remote peer supplied. `/etc/cron.d/x` or `../../escape` would
have been written wherever the process can reach.
`confineToWorkspace` accepts only a non-empty relative path resolving
under the live cwd, and the download refuses anything else. The refusal
throws inside the dispatch's existing try, so it reaches the model as a
`ReadMcpResourceError` rather than a silent success or a crash.
(cherry picked from commit 963cfee21a56576033ec115db745bb18ab0a8d06)
`ReadMcpResourceExecArgs.download_path` means "write the resource to
this workspace-relative path and return no model content". The handler
I added forwarded only server and uri, so a download reported success
while creating no file and leaving `ReadMcpResourceSuccess.download_path`
unset - the model was pointed at a path that did not exist.
The path now reaches the handler, the bridge writes the bytes (decoding
a base64 blob, or the joined text) under the session cwd, and the
answer carries the path with the content oneof deliberately unset: a
host that also has the payload on hand must not have it forwarded, or
the download mode puts it right back in context.
(cherry picked from commit f0a6784533201f412529fb0ae5a6542531012197)
The bridge looked for a flat `details.resultLimitReached`. `glob` sets
that alongside the structured meta, so `pi_find` worked; `read` - the
tool serving `pi_ls` - records the cap only through `OutputMeta`, at
`details.meta.limits.resultLimit.reached`. Every capped listing
therefore reached Cursor with `entry_limit_reached` unset, which reads
as a complete listing.
Both shapes are now checked, mirroring how `piTruncation` already
handles its two producers. Covered by running the real `ReadTool`
against a directory that trips the per-directory cap and asserting the
wire field, so a move in the producer's shape fails here instead of
silently sending clipped output as whole.
(cherry picked from commit cbfe7ca9d59faa2f967e2724744b58a96a9a1839)
`list_mcp_resources` / `read_mcp_resource` answered as though this
client hosted no MCP servers - a hardcoded empty catalog and
`not_found`. The same session reads those resources through `mcp://`
via `MCPManager.getServerResources` / `readServerResource`, so a Cursor
model could not see resources its own session was connected to.
`CursorExecHandlers` gained `listMcpResources`/`readMcpResource`, the
bridge answers them from the manager's live connections, and the
no-handler fallback is unchanged. A throwing lookup surfaces as an
error: an empty success claims "asked, none exist", which the model
cannot retry.
The native `delete` frame also bypassed approval. Unlike every other
frame it calls `fs.rmSync` directly rather than running a registry
tool, so no `ExtensionToolWrapper` sat in front of it, and
`allowNativeDelete` only answers whether a mutating tool was granted -
not whether the user's policy allows the call. It now resolves the
write tier against the session's approval mode and per-tool policies,
failing closed on `always-ask`, which this channel cannot prompt in.
(cherry picked from commit 44d36d1e8d35b0038d00e0202454d68fbcc53bce)
Two independent bugs found in review.
A stream that dies mid-turn takes the terminal-error path: `settleH2`
rejects when the transport closes without `turnEnded`, so the flush on
the success path never runs. `connect_scm` and native todo blocks are
stamped `kCursorExecResolved` at start, so `agent-loop.ts` synthesizes
no placeholder and only their completion frame pairs a result - the call
was left unpaired and its card animating, and `buildSessionContext`
strips a dangling call from every rebuilt transcript. The catch path now
closes open blocks and pairs those server-owned calls with an
interrupted result. Exec-settled MCP blocks are excluded: the dispatch
that ran them owns their result and `drainInFlightDispatches` awaits it,
so pairing here would duplicate against the same id.
Separately, the advisor bridge supplied no `getToolContext`.
`ExtensionToolWrapper` reads the approval mode, per-tool policies and
`autoApprove` only from that execute-time context, so every wrapped
advisor bridge tool resolved as `yolo` with empty policies - a
configured `ask` or `deny` on `edit`/`grep` did not apply to native
frames. Advisors now get the same `ToolContextStore` as the primary
bridge.
Both are covered against the real paths: the interrupted call through
the HTTP/2 fixture server (a helper-level test passes even with the
catch-path flush removed), and approval through real deny policies.
(cherry picked from commit 5ace682578af96708caf88db2d44b9077a1c0e74)
The primary bridge builds a `replace`-mode `EditTool` because
`PiEditExecArgs` carries `old_text`/`new_text` pairs that no other mode
accepts. The advisor roster passed its own instances straight through,
and those follow the session's configured `edit.mode` - `hashline` by
default, whose schema is a single `input` string - so every native
advisor edit failed validation instead of touching the file.
Both bridge-only tools now come from `cursor-bridge-tools.ts`:
`createBridgeEditTool` builds the wrapped `replace` instance, and
`bridgeToolMap` substitutes it into a granted map. The substitution is
gated on `edit` actually having been granted, since the tool is
constructed rather than looked up - handing one to a read-only roster is
the #5680 escalation. The advisor's own loop keeps its instance; only
the exec map is swapped.
(cherry picked from commit e6cf9f8046c595cab9793b4b2a5795d8488d8d22)
Both are constructed rather than looked up, and `executeTool` prefers a
constructed override over the registry — so a session that withheld
either still got a working frame. Native `pi_edit`/`pi_grep` arrive
regardless of the advertised catalog, so a restricted agent
(`toolNames` without them, or `restrictToolNames: true`) could modify
and search files it was never granted.
Both now check the registry for the grant before building. The edit
check reads it before the Cursor-specific delete, since that delete is
about not advertising the tool, not about revoking it. This is the same
escalation the `delete` frame already guards against (#5680); the
advisor path got the grep gate in the previous commit and the primary
session was missed.
(cherry picked from commit 68f82b0ce08bb93db941e0fbe1bd2a515d45c2cb)
`timeout` is `optional int32` and `bash` documents `0` as "disables the
command deadline". Both the bridge and the provider's synthesized block
gated on `timeout && timeout > 0`, folding a supplied `0` into unset —
so the 300s default applied and the long-running command that asked not
to be killed was killed.
The expression was duplicated across the two sides, which is the drift
the shared translation exists to prevent, so it moves into
`cursor-pi-args` as `piTimeout` alongside the other presence-sensitive
mappings. Negatives have no local meaning and would clamp to `bash`'s 1s
floor, so those still fall back to the default.
Verified against a real BashTool: `timeout: 0` yields
`timeoutDisabled: true`, omitted yields the default, `42` passes
through, and `-5` matches the omitted case rather than the 1s clamp.
Mutation-checked on both branches.
(cherry picked from commit db442ae5aed90dc2268b2d898ef99ef4e0961c10)
Three defects the exec bridge shipped with, all found by review.
`pi_edit` never worked. The session removes `edit` from the tool
registry for Cursor so the model is steered to full-file `write`
(8ba0498eb), but that same registry is the bridge's tool source, so the
native frame — which the server sends regardless of the advertised
catalog — resolved nothing and answered `Tool "edit" not available`.
Retaining the instance is not enough either: `PiEditExecArgs` carries
`old_text`/`new_text` pairs, which only `replace` accepts, while the
default mode is `hashline` (`{ input: string }`). `EditTool` now takes
an optional mode, and the bridge resolves a pinned `replace` instance
through its fallback resolver.
A `pi_grep` frame carrying `context` or `limit` escaped the approval
gate. Honoring those needs a per-call tool, and the per-call instance
was built raw while every registry tool is wrapped — so exactly those
calls skipped `tools.approval.grep` and the exec-tier SSH check. Both
callsites now go through one `createBridgeGrepFactory`.
Advisors ignored the same two fields: only the primary session supplied
the factory. They now get it too, gated on the advisor actually holding
`grep` so the factory cannot grant a denied tool.
Also moves the pure Pi arg translation to `providers/cursor-pi-args`.
The legacy shim shares it and is compiled into the bundled virtual
registry, where `./providers/*` cannot match a nested specifier — it
fell through to `Bun.resolveSync`, unsatisfiable under bunfs (#3442) —
and the exec module would have dragged the protobuf graph along.
Verified against real files and the real module graph: `pi_edit` mutates
a temp file, the bundled probe executes the shim's shared module in a
subprocess, and the grep test drives the shared factory. Mutation-
checked: returning a raw tool from the factory, ignoring the pinned edit
mode, dropping the `getTool` fallback, or moving the helpers back to a
nested path each fails a test.
(cherry picked from commit e46ba22b634e449005f7c22b6d0efd19a45ce1f8)
Two truncation records exist locally. `read`/`grep` set
`details.truncation` (`TruncationResult`), which carries an explicit
`truncated` boolean. `bash` sets `details.meta.truncation`
(`TruncationMeta`), which has no such flag — its presence is the signal.
`piTruncation` read only the first and required the boolean, so every
real Bash truncation was dropped: Cursor got clipped output with no
indication it was clipped. Both shapes now translate; `TruncationResult`
stays authoritative when present so an explicit `false` still suppresses.
Also drops the legacy pi shim's copies of the regex-literal escaper and
the path/glob join. Both were verbatim duplicates of the modern bridge's
helpers, which is the drift the shared translation exists to prevent.
Verified producer-to-consumer, not against a hand-built bag: the test
runs a real `BashTool`, asserts its output has no top-level `truncation`
and no `truncated` flag under `meta`, then feeds those exact details to
`piTruncation`. Typed against the producer's own `TruncationMeta`, so a
renamed field fails compilation rather than silently reverting the bug.
Mutation-checked: reverting to the top-level lookup, restoring the flag
requirement, or dropping the null guard each fails a test.
(cherry picked from commit 6699672d52061b832677dd45315f4aba8d330db1)
`pi_grep` carries a context width and a total match cap. Neither is
expressible in the model-facing `grep` schema — context comes from
`grep.contextBefore`/`grep.contextAfter`, fixed when the shared tool is
constructed — so both were dropped.
`GrepTool` now takes them as constructor options. The model-facing
schema is unchanged: this is a seam for wire bridges whose protocol
supplies the values, mirroring `GlobTool`'s existing options bag. The
bridge builds a per-call `grep` only for frames that supply them;
everything else keeps the shared instance and session defaults.
`pi_ls`'s `limit` stays unmapped, now deliberately and documented. It
caps directory entries, while the local `read` renders a depth-2 tree
and slices rendered lines — nested rows, headers and elision summaries
all count — so `:1+K` would cap a different unit while looking honored.
Verified against real files in a temp dir, not captured arguments:
match counts and context lines are asserted from actual search output.
Mutation-checked — ignoring either option, or dropping the scoped tool
in the bridge, fails a test.
(cherry picked from commit 299ded5a274427c2c2d5de27c00a2056a709581c)
Review of the modern exec wire protocol surfaced defects the committed
suite did not pin.
The Pi bridge dropped frame arguments: `pi_read`'s offset/limit (ranged
reads returned whole files), `pi_grep`'s literal (fixed strings ran as
regexes), and the path/glob join emitted `./`-prefixed specs. These are
`optional int32`, so a present `0` is a value, not "unset" — `limit: 0`
now answers empty rather than reading everything, and `pi_find` clamps
to 1 like the reference client.
The provider synthesized its transcript block from a second, divergent
translation of the same frame, so the displayed operation differed from
the executed one. Both sides now share one mapper in `exec-modern.ts`.
End-of-transport cleanup reparsed every open block's streamed argument
buffer; blocks whose args arrive whole never set that buffer, and
`parseStreamingJson(undefined)` is `{}`, so a truncated turn erased
their arguments.
All fixes are mutation-verified: reverting each one fails a test.
(cherry picked from commit bb7bcfebce4200d436e17d6e39320da13fc85ca8)
Current Cursor CLI builds emit exec frames this client did not model. A
frame whose oneof number is absent from `agent.proto` decodes with
`message.case` unset, so the dispatcher found no handler, ran no tool and
sent no result — the server was left waiting on an execution that never
happened.
Every recognised frame now gets a typed answer:
- The seven Pi tools (45-51) run their local equivalents. They are a
separate wire family from the legacy args, not aliases: `pi_grep`'s
`ignore_case` is the inverse of the local `case` flag, `pi_find`
searches filenames (so it routes to `glob`, not `grep`), and
`pi_edit`'s replacements are renamed to snake_case pairs.
- Hooks, subagents, prechecks, MCP state, smart-mode, canvas,
conversation search and agent-store answer with the error, not-found or
empty-but-valid variant that is true of this client.
- Unnameable frames raise `ExecClientControlMessage.throw`
(`unknown_exec_variant`); recognised frames with no truthful answer —
`git_diff_request`, whose `GetDiffResponse` has no error variant —
raise `exec_variant_unsupported`.
Four frames previously answered `create(XSchema, {})`. In proto3 that is
not an empty result: the oneof is unset and the server reads it as "the
tool ran and produced nothing", indistinguishable from success. They now
send real variants.
`connect_scm` lost its repository (the target rides in a oneof, so the
flat property was always undefined) and settled on a fixed failure at the
announcement, before the server's `success`/`error`/`rejected` verdict
arrived on the completion frame.
The stream decoder tracked a single "current" tool-call block and settled
it on any `toolCallCompleted`, ignoring the envelope `call_id`: an
unrelated completion paired the wrong block, and `start A, start B`
orphaned A so nothing ever paired it — which strips the whole interaction
from every rebuilt transcript. Blocks are now retained per envelope id.
`lsp` is advertised as MCP again; the native `diagnostics` frame covers
one of ~10 actions.
(cherry picked from commit 4d269724a3a448886d13b4323ac02aadbfe38de3)
- Support parsing compacted records with replacement history and conversion to compaction entries.
- Add test coverage for foreign session import of Codex session compactions.
- Implemented session stores and metadata converters to import Claude and Codex sessions into OMP.
- Added `--from-claude` and `--from-codex` CLI flags and `/resume` command arguments for foreign session resolution.
- Updated session selector components and controllers to support listing and picking external agent sessions.
- Added comprehensive unit tests and documentation covering foreign session import functionality.
Waited briefly for process exit publication after clean stdout EOF so the process handler preserves the real exit code and stderr, while genuine reader errors still tear down immediately.
Cleared only the matching initialization failure for explicit reloads and added regressions for quick exits, reader errors, ordinary backoff, and immediate reload retries.
Fixes#7041
(cherry picked from commit a76522b759f14421202d4cc437ec611b78be20d1)
The models config resource regression started two cold child processes inside one five-second test. Under parallel CI chunk load, the second child could still be waiting for pipe drain or process exit after the validator had completed.
Keep the process boundary as the owner of the lifecycle measurement and run the missing and custom phases in one child. The missing phase closes its storage and registry before the baseline snapshot, while the custom phase proves schema identity and retention without changing config loading or validator cleanup semantics.
Signed-off-by: Christian Stewart <christian@aperture.us>
(cherry picked from commit 81fa98491544c7fbcbf075922889e0a9e1a0a3b4)
Spawn-based lazy-loading tests assert exitCode===0 on a child process but
set no per-test timeout, so bun's 5s default kills the child under CPU
contention and the assertion reports a dead child rather than a regression.
Give each spawn test an explicit 60s per-test timeout, matching the
existing precedent in auth-gateway-anthropic-caching.test.ts.
Fixes#7018
(cherry picked from commit 00e5ec8855eb8ba31c1bdf571bd7c16f2405d679)
The soft request budget resolved to `SOFT_REQUEST_BUDGET[agent.name] ??
configured`, so the bundled entries for scout and sonic replaced the
configured value outright. Lowering `task.softRequestBudget` to tighten
the guard therefore did nothing for exactly the two agents that spawn
most often: a scout kept its 100-request budget no matter how small the
user set the knob. Only 0 (disable) and raising the value for
non-bundled agents had any effect.
Treat both numbers as upper bounds and take the smaller one. The bundled
entries stay ceilings, so a runaway scout is still stopped at 100 by
default and existing behavior is unchanged for anyone who has not
lowered the setting; a configured 0 still disables the guard entirely.
Resolution moves into `resolveSoftRequestBudget`, which also normalizes
negative and fractional inputs, so the rule is testable without standing
up a subprocess run.
This composes with `task.maxEffort` on a separate axis: effort caps how
hard each request thinks, this caps how many requests a run may spend.
(cherry picked from commit f0db29f8f725f11390b64ca9342300c482ff5c5d)
Catalog summaries of mounted xd:// devices are inlined verbatim into the
system prompt. External devices (MCP servers, plugins) supply that text, and
it was bounded only by character count: a summary of multi-byte script passed
roughly three times the intended budget, and control characters survived into
the prompt where they can forge structure.
Summaries now go through a single sanitize-and-bound step that strips C0/C1
control characters and bounds the result in UTF-8 bytes via the central
truncateHeadBytes helper, so a cut lands on a code point boundary and never
renders a partial code point. The built-in/external distinction is derived
once per entry, and that same boolean both selects the description cap and is
exposed as `dynamic`, so the cap and the flag cannot disagree. The prompt uses
the flag to state that dynamic summaries are untrusted metadata, and the mount
notice says the same for newly appeared devices.
(cherry picked from commit 5989da6235d820bc687779a791e655e6f1b2df0f)
Diogo Soares Rodrigues