- Added `_require_fetch_ref` validator to enforce strict alphanumeric character sets and disallow special git characters (e.g., `:`, `--`, `..`, `*`).
- Integrated validation into `git_fetch_ref_endpoint` to block malicious refspec inputs before git execution.
- Added test cases in `test_proxy_server.py` to verify rejection of attempted shell and refspec injections.
- Added a check to reject remote URLs that begin with a hyphen to prevent command-line option injection.
- Updated the test suite to verify that option-shaped URLs are correctly blocked.
- Extracted `_pat_safe_remote` and rejected HTTP(S) origins with embedded credentials or mismatched host/repo.
- Guarded `clone` via `_assert_clone_url_safe` on the caller-supplied `clone_url` (pool has no `origin` yet).
- Asserted origin safety before `fetch`, `fetch_ref`, and `fetch_pr_head` inject the PAT header.
- Appended POSIX `--` separator in `omp_local` so prompts starting with `-` aren't parsed as flags.
- Added proxy tests covering attacker-origin fetch rejection and unsafe `clone_url` refusal.
Co-authored-by: can1357 <me@can.ac>
- Added `review_pr` task that checks out PR head in a detached worktree, classifies rank/type/area, and posts a batched GitHub review as `event=COMMENT`.
- Added four new host tools: `fetch_pr`, `classify_pr`, `pr_review_comment`, and `submit_pr_review`; review tools self-gate on `review_mode`, push/open-PR tools refuse when `review_mode` is set.
- Added sqlite staging table `pr_review_comments` with `stage_review_comment`, `list_staged_review_comments`, and `clear_staged_review_comments` DAOs.
- Routed `pull_request.opened/reopened/ready_for_review` to `review_pr` and extended `pull_request.closed` cleanup to any tracked PR regardless of author.
can1357