security(proxy): prevented malicious refspec injection via input validation

- Added `_require_fetch_ref` validator to enforce strict alphanumeric character sets and disallow special git characters (e.g., `:`, `--`, `..`, `*`).
- Integrated validation into `git_fetch_ref_endpoint` to block malicious refspec inputs before git execution.
- Added test cases in `test_proxy_server.py` to verify rejection of attempted shell and refspec injections.

python/robomp/src/proxy/server.py

@@ -108,6 +108,36 @@ def _require_int(value: Any, field: str) -> int:
     return value
 
 
+_SAFE_REF_BODY_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+")
+
+
+def _require_fetch_ref(value: Any) -> str:
+    """Validate the base-branch ref for `/gh/v1/git/fetch_ref`.
+
+    The orchestrator only ever fetches a branch — a bare name (`main`,
+    `farm/x/y`, `alice/fix-parser`) or `refs/heads/<name>`. Reject anything
+    `git_ops._branch_refspec` would otherwise pass verbatim into the fetch
+    refspec: `:` (refspec injection — write arbitrary refs in the shared
+    pool), a leading `-` (argv option injection), and (via the charset) `*`
+    `+` `~` `^` `@` `?` `[` `\\`, whitespace, and control bytes; plus the
+    git-invalid `..` / `//` / leading-or-trailing `/` / trailing `.`|`.lock`
+    forms. Normal slashy branch names still pass.
+    """
+    ref = _require_str(value, "ref")
+    body = ref.removeprefix("refs/heads/")
+    if (
+        not body
+        or ref.startswith("-")
+        or body.startswith("/")
+        or body.endswith(("/", ".", ".lock"))
+        or "//" in body
+        or ".." in body
+        or not _SAFE_REF_BODY_RE.fullmatch(body)
+    ):
+        raise HTTPException(400, "invalid ref")
+    return ref
+
+
 def _optional_slot_uid(value: Any) -> int | None:
     if value is None:
         return None
@@ -731,7 +761,7 @@ def create_proxy_app(settings: Settings) -> FastAPI:
     async def git_fetch_ref_endpoint(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
         data = await _json_body(request)
         repo = _require_str(data.get("repo"), "repo")
-        ref = _require_str(data.get("ref"), "ref")
+        ref = _require_fetch_ref(data.get("ref"))
         target = _pool_dir(settings, repo)
         remote = await asyncio.to_thread(_origin_remote_auth, target, repo, _resolve_token(settings))
         # fetch_ref is intentionally best-effort; never surfaces a 5xx.

python/robomp/tests/test_proxy_server.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import json
 import os
 import platform
 import subprocess
@@ -1203,3 +1204,50 @@ async def test_git_push_rejects_attacker_pushurl(proxy_settings: Settings, upstr
         )
     assert resp.status_code == 400, resp.text
     assert not _bare_has_branch(upstream_repo, branch)
+
+# ============================================================================
+# fetch_ref refuses refspec / option injection in `ref`
+# ============================================================================
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "bad_ref",
+    [
+        "refs/heads/x:refs/heads/evil",  # `:` -> refspec injection (arbitrary local ref write)
+        "--upload-pack=env",  # leading dash -> argv option injection
+        "+refs/heads/*:refs/remotes/origin/x",  # `+`/`*` wildcard refspec
+        "refs/heads/*",  # wildcard
+        "a..b",  # `..` range token
+        "ref with space",  # whitespace / control
+        "feature/",  # trailing slash
+    ],
+)
+async def test_git_fetch_ref_rejects_injection_refs(proxy_settings: Settings, bad_ref: str) -> None:
+    """`ref` is interpolated into the fetch refspec, so a `:`/leading-dash/
+    wildcard ref MUST be refused with 400 — validation runs before any git op,
+    so no pool needs to exist."""
+    app = _build_app(proxy_settings)
+    body = json.dumps({"repo": "octo/widget", "ref": bad_ref}).encode()
+    async with await _async_client(app) as client:
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/gh/v1/git/fetch_ref",
+            content=body,
+            headers={**_signed("POST", "/gh/v1/git/fetch_ref", body), "Content-Type": "application/json"},
+        )
+    assert resp.status_code == 400, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_git_fetch_ref_allows_slashy_branch_name(proxy_settings: Settings, upstream_repo: Path) -> None:
+    """A normal PR-head-style branch (`contrib/fix-parser`) MUST pass validation.
+    fetch_ref is best-effort, so a clean ref against the staged pool returns 200
+    even though that branch isn't on the local upstream."""
+    _stage_pool(proxy_settings, upstream_repo)
+    app = _build_app(proxy_settings)
+    body = json.dumps({"repo": "octo/widget", "ref": "contrib/fix-parser"}).encode()
+    async with await _async_client(app) as client:
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/gh/v1/git/fetch_ref",
+            content=body,
+            headers={**_signed("POST", "/gh/v1/git/fetch_ref", body), "Content-Type": "application/json"},
+        )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text