feat(python/robomp): implemented has_authorized_impl_event in the

- Implement `has_authorized_impl_event` in the database to retrieve historical authorization state.
- Update `_enforce_impl_authorization` to permit actions if prior events on the issue provided implementation authorization.
- Normalize maintainer logins by stripping `[bot]` suffixes and allow match-regex to ignore them.
This commit is contained in:
can1357
2026-06-21 19:18:37 +02:00
parent 4b2e4085e0
commit 24a0c8428a
10 changed files with 140 additions and 29 deletions
+2 -2
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@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ ROBOMP_GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL=
ROBOMP_REPO_ALLOWLIST=
# Optional comma-separated GitHub logins whose @ROBOMP_BOT_LOGIN comments may
# authorize implementation work in addition to repo OWNER. `@` and case do not
# matter; use the webhook actor login, not a display name.
# authorize implementation work in addition to repo OWNER. Prefer lowercase
# bare logins; startup ignores leading `@`, case, whitespace, and `[bot]`.
ROBOMP_MAINTAINER_LOGINS=
+1 -1
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@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Lint + format: TypeScript via Biome (config in `biome.json`), Python via Ruff (c
- **Package manager**: `pip` only. No poetry / uv / pdm files; don't introduce one.
- **Task runner**: `bun` (root `package.json` `scripts`). Always reach for an existing `bun run` recipe before invoking `docker compose` or `pytest` directly.
- **Container runtime**: Docker Compose v2. The image embeds Bun 1.3.14 + a rustup launcher and exposes `omp` via a `/usr/local/bin/omp` shim; `ROBOMP_OMP_COMMAND=omp` should not need changing.
- **Required env** (set in `.env`, see `.env.example`): `GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET`, `ROBOMP_BOT_LOGIN`, `ROBOMP_GIT_AUTHOR_NAME`, `ROBOMP_GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL`, `ROBOMP_REPO_ALLOWLIST`, plus model knobs (`ROBOMP_MODEL`, `ROBOMP_THINKING`, optional `ROBOMP_PROVIDER`) and rate-limit / concurrency / timeout overrides. Set `ROBOMP_BOT_LOGIN` to the lowercase mention handle (`roboomp` in production, no leading `@` or `[bot]`; config normalizes common variants). `ROBOMP_MAINTAINER_LOGINS` is optional comma-separated logins (`@` optional, case-insensitive) for non-owner implementation authorizers. **GitHub auth is mode-exclusive**: either set `ROBOMP_GH_PROXY_URL` + `ROBOMP_GH_PROXY_HMAC_KEY` (gh-proxy mode; PAT lives only in the sidecar container — the bundled compose default), or set `GITHUB_TOKEN` directly (single-process PAT mode). `Settings._validate_proxy_or_pat` rejects a `.env` that sets both.
- **Required env** (set in `.env`, see `.env.example`): `GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET`, `ROBOMP_BOT_LOGIN`, `ROBOMP_GIT_AUTHOR_NAME`, `ROBOMP_GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL`, `ROBOMP_REPO_ALLOWLIST`, plus model knobs (`ROBOMP_MODEL`, `ROBOMP_THINKING`, optional `ROBOMP_PROVIDER`) and rate-limit / concurrency / timeout overrides. Set `ROBOMP_BOT_LOGIN` to the lowercase mention handle (`roboomp` in production, no leading `@` or `[bot]`; config normalizes common variants). `ROBOMP_MAINTAINER_LOGINS` is optional comma-separated bare logins (`@`/`[bot]` optional, case-insensitive) for non-owner implementation authorizers. **GitHub auth is mode-exclusive**: either set `ROBOMP_GH_PROXY_URL` + `ROBOMP_GH_PROXY_HMAC_KEY` (gh-proxy mode; PAT lives only in the sidecar container — the bundled compose default), or set `GITHUB_TOKEN` directly (single-process PAT mode). `Settings._validate_proxy_or_pat` rejects a `.env` that sets both.
- **PI_ROOT resolution**: roboomp lives inside the oh-my-pi monorepo at `python/robomp/`. `bun run pi:image` builds the parent monorepo (`../..`) as its docker build context to produce `oh-my-pi/pi:dev`; `docker-compose.yml` extends that image via `PI_BASE` and mounts the same parent path read-only at `/work/pi` for the orchestrator to see live source. Override `PI_ROOT` only when pointing the build/mount at a different oh-my-pi checkout. Inside the container the path is always `/work/pi`. Build invalidation stays bounded: Python-only edits in roboomp never trigger a natives recompile.
- **Forbidden**: no docker-in-docker, no extra service containers, no new background workers outside `WorkerPool`. The container itself is the isolation boundary; per-issue isolation is the git worktree.
+4 -1
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@@ -305,7 +305,10 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
@property
def maintainer_logins(self) -> frozenset[str]:
items = [piece.strip().lstrip("@").lower() for piece in self.maintainer_logins_raw.split(",")]
items = [
piece.strip().lstrip("@").lower().removesuffix("[bot]")
for piece in self.maintainer_logins_raw.split(",")
]
return frozenset(item for item in items if item)
def allows(self, full_name: str) -> bool:
+20
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@@ -607,6 +607,26 @@ class Database:
last_error=row["last_error"],
)
def has_authorized_impl_event(self, issue_key: str) -> bool:
"""Return whether a non-skipped event on this issue carried implementation authorization."""
with self._lock:
rows = self._conn.execute(
"""
SELECT payload_json
FROM events
WHERE issue_key = ?
AND state <> 'skipped'
ORDER BY received_at DESC
""",
(issue_key,),
).fetchall()
for row in rows:
payload = json.loads(row["payload_json"])
directive = payload.get("_robomp_directive")
if isinstance(directive, dict) and directive.get("authorizes_impl") is True:
return True
return False
def requeue_event(
self,
delivery_id: str,
+4 -9
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@@ -89,16 +89,11 @@ def _login_matches_personal_repo_owner(
raw_type = owner.get("type")
if isinstance(raw_type, str) and raw_type:
owner_type = raw_type
if owner_type is not None and owner_type.lower() == "organization":
if owner_type is None or owner_type.lower() != "user":
return False
if not owner_login:
return False
if owner_login:
return login.lower() == owner_login.lower()
if not isinstance(repo, str):
return False
owner, sep, _name = repo.partition("/")
if not sep or not owner:
return False
return login.lower() == owner.lower()
def _effective_association(
@@ -158,7 +153,7 @@ def extract_mention(body: str | None, bot_login: str) -> str | None:
if not login:
return None
pattern = re.compile(
rf"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])@{re.escape(login)}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])",
rf"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])@{re.escape(login)}(?:\[bot\])?(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
if not pattern.search(body):
+2
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@@ -1121,6 +1121,8 @@ def _enforce_impl_authorization(
"""Refuse first publish on issue classes that require maintainer authorization."""
if bindings.impl_authorized:
return
if bindings.db.has_authorized_impl_event(bindings.issue_key):
return
row = bindings.db.get_issue(bindings.issue_key)
if row is not None:
if row.pr_number is not None:
+4 -4
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@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ def test_maintainer_logins_normalize_csv_entries(
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOMP_MAINTAINER_LOGINS", " can1357, @ROBOOMP , @Alice[bot] ,, ")
reset_settings_cache()
cfg = Settings() # type: ignore[call-arg]
assert cfg.maintainer_logins == frozenset({"can1357", "roboomp", "alice[bot]"})
assert cfg.maintainer_logins == frozenset({"can1357", "roboomp", "alice"})
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
@@ -128,9 +128,9 @@ def test_maintainer_logins_normalize_csv_entries(
("roboomp", "roboomp"),
(" @roboomp ", "roboomp"),
(" @ROBOOMP ", "roboomp"),
("roboomp[bot]", "roboomp[bot]"),
("@roboomp[bot]", "roboomp[bot]"),
(" @ROBOOMP[BOT] ", "roboomp[bot]"),
("roboomp[bot]", "roboomp"),
("@roboomp[bot]", "roboomp"),
(" @ROBOOMP[BOT] ", "roboomp"),
],
)
def test_maintainer_logins_common_entry_forms(
@@ -534,6 +534,10 @@ def test_extract_mention_accepts_prefixed_or_app_bot_login(configured_login: str
assert extract_mention("@roboomp go ahead", configured_login) == "go ahead"
def test_extract_mention_strips_literal_app_suffix_from_body() -> None:
assert extract_mention("@roboomp[bot] go ahead", "roboomp[bot]") == "go ahead"
def test_extract_mention_returns_none_without_mention() -> None:
assert extract_mention("hello there", "robomp-bot") is None
assert extract_mention(None, "robomp-bot") is None
+91 -12
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@@ -1181,8 +1181,9 @@ def test_review_mode_rejects_push_and_open_pr_before_repo_commands(db: Database,
assert calls == []
def test_impl_gate_rejects_unauthorized_proposal_before_repo_commands(
db: Database, tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
@pytest.mark.parametrize("classification", ["enhancement", "proposal"])
def test_impl_gate_rejects_unauthorized_non_auto_classification_before_repo_commands(
db: Database, tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, classification: str
) -> None:
calls: list[list[str] | tuple[str, ...]] = []
@@ -1192,7 +1193,7 @@ def test_impl_gate_rejects_unauthorized_proposal_before_repo_commands(
raise AssertionError("repo command must not run before implementation authorization")
bindings, loop, t = _bindings(db, tmp_path, httpx.MockTransport(lambda _r: httpx.Response(500)))
db.set_issue_classification(bindings.issue_key, "proposal")
db.set_issue_classification(bindings.issue_key, classification)
monkeypatch.setattr(host_tools, "_run_repo_command", record_repo_command)
try:
push = next(x for x in build(bindings) if x.name == "gh_push_branch")
@@ -1205,7 +1206,7 @@ def test_impl_gate_rejects_unauthorized_proposal_before_repo_commands(
_stop_loop(loop, t)
for msg in (str(push_exc.value), str(pr_exc.value)):
assert "classified `proposal`" in msg
assert f"classified `{classification}`" in msg
assert "OWNER or allowlisted maintainer" in msg
assert "gh_post_comment" in msg
assert calls == []
@@ -1213,14 +1214,17 @@ def test_impl_gate_rejects_unauthorized_proposal_before_repo_commands(
"SELECT tool, error FROM tool_calls WHERE tool IN ('gh_push_branch', 'gh_open_pr') ORDER BY id"
).fetchall()
assert [row["tool"] for row in rows] == ["gh_push_branch", "gh_open_pr"]
assert all("classified `proposal`" in row["error"] for row in rows)
assert all(f"classified `{classification}`" in row["error"] for row in rows)
def test_impl_gate_allows_authorized_proposal_to_reach_pr_validation(db: Database, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
@pytest.mark.parametrize("classification", ["enhancement", "proposal"])
def test_impl_gate_allows_authorized_non_auto_classification_to_reach_pr_validation(
db: Database, tmp_path: Path, classification: str
) -> None:
from dataclasses import replace
bindings, loop, t = _bindings(db, tmp_path, httpx.MockTransport(lambda _r: httpx.Response(500)))
db.set_issue_classification(bindings.issue_key, "proposal")
db.set_issue_classification(bindings.issue_key, classification)
bindings = replace(bindings, impl_authorized=True)
try:
tool = next(x for x in build(bindings) if x.name == "gh_open_pr")
@@ -1234,8 +1238,9 @@ def test_impl_gate_allows_authorized_proposal_to_reach_pr_validation(db: Databas
assert "OWNER or allowlisted maintainer" not in msg
def test_impl_gate_allows_authorized_proposal_push_to_reach_repo_commands(
db: Database, tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
@pytest.mark.parametrize("classification", ["enhancement", "proposal"])
def test_impl_gate_allows_authorized_non_auto_classification_push_to_reach_repo_commands(
db: Database, tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, classification: str
) -> None:
from dataclasses import replace
@@ -1244,15 +1249,15 @@ def test_impl_gate_allows_authorized_proposal_push_to_reach_repo_commands(
def record_repo_command(_bindings: ToolBindings, cmd: list[str] | tuple[str, ...], *, timeout: float | None = None):
del timeout
calls.append(cmd)
raise RuntimeError("authorized proposal reached gh_push_branch repo command")
raise RuntimeError("authorized non-auto issue reached gh_push_branch repo command")
bindings, loop, t = _bindings(db, tmp_path, httpx.MockTransport(lambda _r: httpx.Response(500)))
db.set_issue_classification(bindings.issue_key, "proposal")
db.set_issue_classification(bindings.issue_key, classification)
bindings = replace(bindings, impl_authorized=True)
monkeypatch.setattr(host_tools, "_run_repo_command", record_repo_command)
try:
tool = next(x for x in build(bindings) if x.name == "gh_push_branch")
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="authorized proposal reached gh_push_branch repo command"):
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="authorized non-auto issue reached gh_push_branch repo command"):
tool.execute({}, _ctx())
finally:
_stop_loop(loop, t)
@@ -1260,6 +1265,80 @@ def test_impl_gate_allows_authorized_proposal_push_to_reach_repo_commands(
assert calls
def test_impl_gate_allows_later_authorized_event_to_reach_repo_commands(
db: Database, tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
) -> None:
calls: list[list[str] | tuple[str, ...]] = []
def record_repo_command(_bindings: ToolBindings, cmd: list[str] | tuple[str, ...], *, timeout: float | None = None):
del timeout
calls.append(cmd)
raise RuntimeError("later authorized event reached gh_push_branch repo command")
bindings, loop, t = _bindings(db, tmp_path, httpx.MockTransport(lambda _r: httpx.Response(500)))
db.set_issue_classification(bindings.issue_key, "enhancement")
db.record_event(
delivery_id="auth-event",
event_type="issue_comment",
repo=bindings.issue.repo,
issue_key=bindings.issue_key,
payload={
"_robomp_directive": {
"body": "go ahead",
"author": "can1357",
"pragmas": [],
"authorizes_impl": True,
}
},
)
monkeypatch.setattr(host_tools, "_run_repo_command", record_repo_command)
try:
tool = next(x for x in build(bindings) if x.name == "gh_push_branch")
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="later authorized event reached gh_push_branch repo command"):
tool.execute({}, _ctx())
finally:
_stop_loop(loop, t)
assert calls
def test_impl_gate_ignores_skipped_authorized_event(db: Database, tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
calls: list[list[str] | tuple[str, ...]] = []
def record_repo_command(_bindings: ToolBindings, cmd: list[str] | tuple[str, ...], *, timeout: float | None = None):
del timeout
calls.append(cmd)
raise AssertionError("skipped authorization must not reach repo command")
bindings, loop, t = _bindings(db, tmp_path, httpx.MockTransport(lambda _r: httpx.Response(500)))
db.set_issue_classification(bindings.issue_key, "enhancement")
db.record_event(
delivery_id="skipped-auth-event",
event_type="issue_comment",
repo=bindings.issue.repo,
issue_key=bindings.issue_key,
payload={
"_robomp_directive": {
"body": "go ahead",
"author": "can1357",
"pragmas": [],
"authorizes_impl": True,
}
},
state="skipped",
)
monkeypatch.setattr(host_tools, "_run_repo_command", record_repo_command)
try:
tool = next(x for x in build(bindings) if x.name == "gh_push_branch")
with pytest.raises(RpcCommandError) as exc:
tool.execute({}, _ctx())
finally:
_stop_loop(loop, t)
assert "OWNER or allowlisted maintainer" in str(exc.value)
assert calls == []
def test_impl_gate_allows_bug_without_directive_to_reach_pr_validation(db: Database, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
bindings, loop, t = _bindings(db, tmp_path, httpx.MockTransport(lambda _r: httpx.Response(500)))
db.set_issue_classification(bindings.issue_key, "bug")
+8
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@@ -1598,8 +1598,16 @@ def test_webhook_maintainer_bypasses_rate_limit(
)
assert resp.status_code == 202
states.append(resp.json()["state"])
directive_event = get_database(cfg.sqlite_path).get_event("m-3")
close_database()
assert states == ["queued"] * 4, states
assert directive_event is not None
assert directive_event.payload.get("_robomp_directive") == {
"body": "do X",
"author": "can1357",
"pragmas": [],
"authorizes_impl": True,
}
# -------- handler-level: bootstrap + reopen ----------------------------